The doctor-patient relationship is examined with an emphasis on the comparison between professional and moral principles. Many therapeutic measures have opposite-directed alternative steps with an equal degree ofjustification, so that no logical preference is attainable and conflicts ensue.
conflicts arise between our devotion to human wellbeing and dignity, and our obligation to disrespect some of their rights for self-determination.
Furthermore, various dutifullyperformed doctoring activities run counter to our own social needs and interests; last, but not least, human imperfection colours some of our decisions, putting a definite blemish on their value. In conclusion, physicians must bear the constant burden of paradoxicallyopposed alternatives, and they confront pitfalls of wrongdoing at every therapeutic step. Their only guidelines are intuition and professional dedication.
The ancient Greek therapeutae (literally: attenders) were spiritualists who busied themselves with continuous intuitive meditation and contemplation. Nowadays, therapeutics has shifted and closed in upon science, thus becoming rather disconnected from intuition or philosophy. Few medical schools teach medical thinking or intuition, or embark on a course similar to Moore's 1 in Melbourne, ' The Ethical Landscape', where discussions are based on passages from belles-lettres depicting doctors' and patients' dilemmas.
Yet within the last few years medical ethics has developed into a well recognised branch of research. Brody 2counted four key issues: a) the nature of doctor-patient relationship, b) informed consent, c) determining the quality of life, d) the right of participation in decision making. Problems aroused by the physicia's own Interests Malpractice-suits and their sequellae point out the antithesis of a membership in the helping profession, on the one side, and any gained profit, on the other; or between altruism and the acquisition of an income. We shall disregard the sad case ofpathological deviation that has turned medicine into a profitable merchandise, and accept only the axiom: even physicians must support their families; a real challenge to conscience. One cannot improvise an easy dissection ofthis Gordian knot.
Another controversy of interests or roles relates to the fact that a medical diploma inspires authority, even though authority is not equivalent to power.17 Medical authority should presuppose moral responsibility, and again we stumble over a systematic ambiguity, as explained by Sumner 18: the doctor's role responsibility is a hybrid of descriptive responsibility (referring to factual treatment and results) and of normative responsibility (i.e., what the case ought to be, according to certain standards). The medical responsibility-paradox is illustrated by the everyday clash with familial obligations: should the telephoneplug stay in during intimate events at home, gatherings and parties ? It is obvious that a meticulous observance of one's oath antagonises most habits of an ordinary family and social life; this, in turn, embitters and hampers one's professional efficiency. Therefore, the medical moral code leads to a sheer imperfection and to shortcomings of a doctor's performance.
The physician's central problem, imperfection, deserves a separate discussion.
Human Imperfecton
There are no paradoxes in cybernetic formulae, computer-diagnosis or mathematical calculation of treatment dosage. Neither is there a computer ethics. The comparison came to my mind while reading Clouser's 19 humble acknowledgement of medical ethics being incapable of truly fine discrimination. All the same, a conscientious emination of various particulars of therapeutics may refine the moral codes to some extent.
For instance, a doctor's adherence to one definite school of thought; one clinician regards a certain pathological process as a definite indication for surgery, while another condemns the operation and always prefers a different intervention. Similarly, one approach to mental derangements is mainly psychopharmacological yet another psychiatrist relies only on psychotherapy. Each of the four swears on his method alone and declares the others all wrong, while actually all four achieve quite similar results. This pattem of events confirms, once more, the laxity of medicine as a science: it is human weakness that makes us hold on and swear on one theory, and let it serve as a frame of reference and provide the (deficient) conviction, with inner doubts hidden behind demonstrated certainty. we are servants to a never-pleased moral judge, and the constant presence of alternatives turns every choice of ours into a potential mistake. Professor Fuchs, the Jerusalem oncologist, once said that whatever we tell a cancer patient, he may insist on the universal human right for true information, but also on his equally valid right to be spared the truth.
Medicine is like a rugged blend of science, humanity, and art, and there are metaphysical inadequacies even in the scientific (supposedly exact) ingredient. Roszak 22 wrote that in the nineteenth century science had struggled for complementarity and had a tolerance for ambiguity, whereas today science is used just to reveal information, while knowledge has become a vague holistic synthesis of facts and values.
In conclusion, there seems no other choice than to turn back to our initial hypothesis. A physician has only two delicate steering-oars to guide him in his moral stumbling-along: the first is intuition, a sixth sense of perception and deduction necessary to adjust an appropriate therapy to every particular patient; the second is belief, along with a professional dedication and a striving to develop the art of medical therapeutics despite all paradoxical pitfalls.
